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The neurosciences challenge ƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŽĐŝĂůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŵŽĚĞůŽĨŚƵŵĂŶďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ
particularly with reference to violence. Although explanations of violence are 
interdisciplinary it remains controversial to work across the division between the social and 
biological sciences. Neuroscience can be subject to familiar sociological critiques of 
scientism and reductionism but this paper considers whether this view should be 
reassessed. Concepts of brain plasticity and epigenetics could prompt reconsideration of the 
dichotomy of the social and natural while raising questions about the intersections of 
materiality, embodiment and social action. Although violence is intimately bound up with 
the body, sociologies of both violence and the body remain on the surface and rarely go 
under the skin or skulls of violent actors. This article argues for a non-reductionist realist 
explanation of violent behaviour that is also interdisciplinary and offers the potential to 
generate nuanced understandings of violent processes. It concludes that sociology should 
engage critically and creatively with the neuroscience of violence.  
Key words: Social science, violence, critical neuroscience, biosocial intra-actions 
Violence is about the body. It is enacted by bodies; it has instrumental and ritual 
manifestations, it creates boundaries and destroys them, as well as violating, polluting and 
destroying bodies. It stands at the intersection of many human sciences with differing 
conceptions of humanness and action yet the relationship between bodies and violent 
behaviour is contested. While in much of the post-tĂƌƉĞƌŝŽĚƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŽĐŝĂůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ
ŵŽĚĞů ? ?^^^D) has had ascendency, over the last two decades neuroscience has challenged 
this and claimed jurisdiction over most facets of human behaviour, including crime, 
empathy, fear, impulsivity, kinship, obesity, racism, suicide, trust, love, violence, wisdom 
and many more (Vrecko, 2010)1. The SSSM is accused of ignoring non-social explanations 
and being closed to the possibility of interaction between genes, brains and social 
experience. In turn neuroscience is accused of reductionism along with individualizing and 
pathologizing social problems. There are fundamental issues at stake here over the nature 




cannot resolve these it does suggest that the debate provides opportunities to reconsider 
sociological concepts of embodiment in relation to explanations of violence. There is often 
demand, especially from research councils, for greater interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary 
and multidisciplinary cooperation but in practice we are often inter, trans and multi with 
disciplines that are most cognate to our own and pose fewest challenges. Although 
bioscience is often accused of reductionism its recent emphasis on plasticity, and in 
particular epigenetics2, suggest productive ground for rethinking the tortured history of 
relations between biology and sociology. One might not go quite so far as Rose (2013) in 
ƐĂǇŝŶŐ ‘EŽůŽŶŐĞƌĂƌĞƐŽĐŝĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
biological. Indeed, the reverse assumption is common  W ŝƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐŵ ?ŝƐ 
passé, the linguistic turn has reached a dead end and a rhetoric of materiality is almost 
ŽďůŝŐĂƚŽƌǇ ? ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁĞĂƌĞŽƵƌďƌĂŝŶƐ ?ŝƐǁŝĚĞůǇ ?if not universally) regarded 
in neuroscience as exaggerated and there are suggestions of possible rapprochement 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ&ƌĂŶŬƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ŶĞƵƌŽƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŚĞůĞĂŶƐŵŽƌĞƚŽ
the neuro than the social. Even so, a review of these formerly entrenched disciplinary 
divisions will pose challenges to both. This discussion focusses on these issues with 
reference to violence and addresses the question posed by Fitzgerald & Callard (2015) that 
ŝƐ ? ‘ǁŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚŚĂƉƉĞŶŝĨǁĞƐĞƚĂƐŝĚĞŽƵƌƵƐƵĂůĚŝƐĐŝƉů ŶĂƌǇĂůůĞŐŝĂŶĐĞƐĂŶĚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
in relation to social and neuroscience? It offers a different answer to theirs3 but takes up 




Sociology, violence and the body 
Violent behaviour is complex and multi-layered and is unlikely to have simple explanations. 
Some social conditions of crime and violence are well known, such as inequality, social 
exclusion, deprivation, cultures of masculinity, youth gang cultures, the drugs trade, 
consumerism and social strain. But these often over-predict its incidence while violent 
perpetrators might not fit these demographic profiles. Indeed, this leads some, such as 
Collins (2008, p.2-3) to dispute the relevance of social structural causes at all. However, 
paradoxically perhaps biosocial explanations might restate the significance of structural and 
demographic factors. Rudo-Hutt et al (2011) claim that hormones and neurotransmitters 
interact with social factors so that while deprivation might account for much violent crime, 
analysis of combinations of childhood abuse with deprivation and genetic risks point 
towards multi-layered explanations of violence. Social structure is relevant then in 
combination with other risk factors which might explain variance from typical demographic 
profiles. Further, reductionist versions of neuroscience (e.g. Rosenberg, 2006) are 
challenged by concepts of emergence  W understanding how phenomena not apparent in 
parts appear in the whole  W which allow multiple, genomic, neurological and social modes of 
explanation that overcome ŚǇƉŽƐƚĂƐŝǌĞĚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞďŽĚǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂů ? ? While 
recognising that the brain is the necessary condition for consciousness, since Cartesian 
dualism now seems untenable, we might rather think in realist terms of overdetermined bi-
directional multiplicity. This might point a way out of the blind alleys of determinism and 
reductionism and view the brain and nervous system as nested in the body and 




Violence is intimately to do with the body and engages intense emotional arousal, in 
particular, aggression, anger, hate and as Randall Collins (2008, passim) argues 
confrontation/fear. Yet violence has received surprisingly little attention from the sociology 
of embodiment, with the exception of feminist theories such as Grosz (1994). Violence is 
mentioned only in passing in Shilling (2012), Turner (1984) and Featherstone et al (1991) 
and not at all by Leder (1990). Moreover, the previously absent body rediscovered in 
sociology is sometimes rather disĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚ ?ƌŽŵďǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝŶŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬ
[on the body], the actual flesh and blood body, the body-brain system of neurones, 
hormones, glial cells, neuro-transmitters, muscles, bones and skin, is largely absent. In its 
ƉůĂĐĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇƵŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚĞĚŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞďŽĚǇĂƐ ?ƚŚĞĐĂƌƌŝĞƌŽĨƐǇŵďŽůŝĐ
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ? ?dŚĞďŽĚǇƚŚĞŶŝƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚ ?ĂĚŽƌŶĞĚ ?ŽďũĞĐƚŝĨŝ Ě ?commodified, technologized 
ĂŶĚĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĚĞĞĚŝƚŝƐ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƚĞůůƵƐŵƵĐŚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞďŽĚǇ ?Ɛ
physical recalcitrance, how it acts as a limit or interacts with social processes. Similarly, 
tŝůůŝĂŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƐŬĞĚ ‘ǁŚĞƌĞŝƐƚŚĞďŽĚǇŝŶŵĞĚŝĐĂůƐŽ ŝŽůŽŐǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ
ĚŝƐĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚ ?ĚŝƐŝŶĐĂƌŶĂƚĞĚĂŶĚĚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝǌĞĚ ?zĞƚďŽĚŝĞƐ ‘ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞƵƐ ?ďĞƚƌĂǇƵƐ ?ĂŶĚ
render our constructions of them problematic. Williams calls for more delving into bodies 
rather than remaining on the outside and Newton (2003) argues similarly. Similarly Shilling 
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇǁŝƚŚ ‘ĐŽƌƉŽƌĞĂůƌĞĂůŝƐŵ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǀŝĞǁƐƚŚĞďŽĚǇĂƐĂ
multidimensional medium of perception, social activities and sensual visceral experience. 
Thus bodies possess a reality of which we are acutely aware through the experiences of 




p.281). It is possible that contemporary neuroscience might open the way for a more 
constructive dialogue. 
Neuroscience is a social practice  
Before examining this dialogue various sociological objections should be considered. One 
ƐƚƌĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨŶĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŝƐƚŽŝŶƐŝƐƚŽŶŝƚƐ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? and 
to point out that what counts as important in the social sphere is likely to be invoked as 
important in neural processes. For example, Troy Duster (2006) rightly critiques the 
tendency to prioritize genetic and neurological research to explain complex social behaviour 
and health outcomes where this ignores the social, economic, and political aspects of 
health. So, for example in 2001-05 when the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and 
Alcoholism commissioned research into exceptionally high rates of alcoholism among Native 
Americans they looked to Identify genes that are involved in alcohol-associated disorders, 
rather than social structural causes. In response to this trend he says that sociologists should 
more systematically demonstrate how the categories on which this apparently objective 
data is founded are really socially constructed. This is a valid though only partial critique.  
It is true that diagnostic criteria and concepts are structured upon certain assumptions and 
understandings about social categories, which Hacking (1995) descrŝďĞƐĂƐ ‘ůŽŽƉŝŶŐĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ?.
 ‘ŝƐŽƌĚĞƌƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞĨŝĂŶƚĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ? ? ‘ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂŶƚŝƐŽĐŝĂů
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ?ĐŽƵůĚďĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐthat locate social problems in individual pathology 
rather than in political issues of inequality and disadvantage (e.g. Eastman & Campbell, 




historical cultural, political and economic formations and brain images have been produced 
in laboratories. As Rose and Abi-Rached (2013, p.76) point out, rĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐ ‘ŶŽŶ-
ƉůĂĐĞƐ ? ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƵŶƵƐƵĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƐƉĂĐĞ ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ?ŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƌǇ ?ƐŽƵŶĚƐĂŶĚ
sights. They are organized spaces in which multiple practices and disciplines including 
neuroscience, computational theory, physics, computer science, statistics, and nuclear 
medicine all intersect. There are resolution limitations in neuroimaging technology, limited 
participant selection and often inadequate distinction is made between different types of 
violence, notably impulsive and predatory (Bufkin & Luttrell, 2005). Moreover, there are 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŽĨƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐŝŶďƌĂŝŶƐĐĂŶĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ?ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐĚƵƌŝŶŐ
ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůƚĂƐŬƐĂƌĞƌĂƌĞůǇĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚǁŝƚŚĂ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞ ?ĂŶůŝ& Amin, 2002; 
Pridmore et al 2005). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measures the increased 
flow of oxygenated blood, which becomes a proxy for cerebral activity but brain regions 
ŵĂǇƐĞƌǀĞŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨŝŵĂŐŝŶŐŝƐ ‘ŵĞƐƐǇ ?ŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞ ? ĂŶĚŶŽƚ ‘ĨĂĐƚ
ƉƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐ ?ďƵƚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ?&ŝƚǌŐĞƌĂůĚ& Callard, 2015). Fine (2010) shows how cultural 
biases enter experimental fMRI evidence of gender differences that then are recycled as 
 ‘ĨĂĐƚƐ ? ?Rather than reject the method though she emphasises the importance of 
understanding brain interconnectivity rather than focus on particular cortical areas (2010, 
p.153). On the other hand, neuroimaging is just one component of a wider set of social and 
life history data and cumulative evidence points to a strong association between increased 
aggressiveness and reduced pre-frontal cortex (PFC) activity (Brower & Price 2001).  
It is also true that caution should be exercised in the use of neurological explanations. First, 




behaviour. PFC disruption is only relevant in combination with social factors that may 
enhance or diminish it (Bufkin & Luttrell, 2005). Second, this data is exclusively based on 
known criminal populations while as Collins shows, the sociology of violence should 
understand the shared dynamics of both legitimate and nonlegitimate violence  W so for 
example the bodily, affective and interactional dynamics of being an army sniper or hitman 
ĂƌĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝŶŐĂŝŶŝŶŐ ‘ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŝŶĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐƉĂĐĞ ?  ? ? ? ?, p.431ff). Third, in group analysis 
high scoring individuals will compensate for low scoring  W ƐŽŶŽƚĂůů ‘ƉƐǇĐŚŽƉĂƚŚƐ ?ǁŝůůŚĂǀĞ
reduced PFC activity (van Veelen, 2009). Fourth, individualized pathology cannot adequately 
account for collective violence and ethnonational conflict, which is often extreme and can 
arise rapidly among people who previously lived together relatively peacefully. The 
epigenetic effects of such conflicts though might have consequences for subsequent 
experience of trauma and responses to stress. Fifth, there are macroƐŽĐŝĂů ‘ĨĂĐƚƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ
inequality and poverty, legislation on lethal weapons and cultural values that affect known 
rates of violence in populations4. Violence is not then a fixed trait but varies historically and 
between societies. If we are to properly understand violence in a global context, then the 
socioeconomic and organizational structures that foster or inhibit violence and how these 
become embodied need to be understood too.  
Nonetheless, the interdependence of the self, emotions, actions and bodies means that just 
ĚŝƐŵŝƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĂƚĂĂƐĂ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?is not sufficient. There is a complex 
interdependence of social and neural processes which needs to be reiterated to botŚ ‘ƐŝĚĞƐ ?
of the debate. Fumagalli and Priori (2006) claim to have identified the brain locations 




ŚŽƌŵŽŶĞƐŵŽĚĞƌĂƚĞŵŽƌĂůďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝĨĚǇƐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂůŐŝǀĞƌŝƐĞƚŽ ‘Ăďnormal 
ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ?However, there is debate over these claims. Abend (2011) argues that 
ŶĞƵƌŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚƐƵƐĞ ‘ƚŚŝŶ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚ ‘ƚŚŝĐŬ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?Experiments, he 
says, ƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ?ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐĂďŽƵƚ ‘ƚŚŝŶĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?ŽĨrightness, 
appropriateness, or permissibility ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ‘ƚŚŝĐŬ ?ŽŶĞƐŽĨdignity, integrity, humanness, 
cruelty, exploitation or fanaticism that are dependent on institutional and cultural 
structures and less easily correlated with neural processes. One might note three further 
issues that will be pursued later in this paper. First, ŵƵĐŚǁŽƌŬŽŶ ‘ŶĞƵƌŽŵŽƌĂůŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ?is 
largely task-oriented (because brain responsiveness to these can be measured by scans) but 
practical moral judgements are often more often tacit, intuitive and subliminal (e.g. Haidt, 
2001). Second, cognitive neuroscience claims to identify various brain locations involved in 
ŵŽƌĂůũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚďƵƚƌĞũĞĐƚƐƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĂ ‘ŵŽƌĂůĐĞŶƚƌĞ ?ŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨĂƐǇƐƚĞŵůŝŶŬŝŶŐ
multiple regions (e.g. Damasio 2012, p.77; Verplaetse et al 2009, p.9-10). Thus Pietrini and 
ĂŵďŝŶŝ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞ ‘EŽĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂůŶĞƵƌŽŝŵĂŐŝŶŐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƚŽĚĂƚĞŚĂƐǇŝĞůĚĞĚ
normative data that can be used to distinguish between the neural correlates of normal and 
ĂďŶŽƌŵĂůďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ?Third, and most important for this discussion, it is often asserted that 
human moral systems evolved to stabilize cooperation and supress aggression but they also 
evoke hostility, conflict, punitiveness, disgust and social aversion  W so there is no simple 
polarity between social order and aggressiveness. Morality is heavily imbricated with 
affectivity and Antonio Damasio (2012, p.125) argues that social emotions, which will be 
considered later, incorporate moral principles and these are embedded in biosocial intra-




mindreading, that is representing the mental states of others, and therefore positive or 
negative social judgements6.    
Neuroplasticity 
Neurological research then is a social practice but, it will argued that a critical engagement 
with neuroscience within wider social theoretical debates is a challenge to reconsider the 
ǀĂŐƵĞƚŽƚĂůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞďŽĚǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ? Indeed, recent developments in neurology 
render simplistic causal analysis out-dated since theories of neuroplasticity suggest new 
modes of biosocial intra-actions. However, neuroscience, as opposed to some popular 
representations of it, models complexity, plasticity and malleability of neural structures. 
WhereaƐƚŚĞďƌĂŝŶǁĂƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐĨŝǆĞĚ ? ‘ƉůĂƐƚŝĐŝƚǇĞǆƚĞŶĚƐďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇ
ƉŚĂƐĞƐŽĨĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?ƚŽ ?ůĂƚĞƌƉĞƌŝŽĚƐŽĨƚŚĞůŝĨĞƐƉĂŶ ? ?ŚĂŵƉĂŐŶĞ, 2010) 
demonstrating ongoing susceptibility to environmental influences. Lemke (2004) argues that 
the ƐŽĐŝĂůƉŽǁĞƌŽĨŐĞŶĞƚŝĐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ůŝĞƐůĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞƐƵƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŐĞŶĞƚŝĐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝƐŵ
ĂŶĚŵŽƌĞŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŐĞŶĞƚŝĐƌŝƐŬƐ ? ?'ĞŶĞƚŝĐƐ ?ŚĞƐĂǇƐ ?ƐĞĞŬƐ ‘ƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?
possibilities and expectations, referring less to a model of determination than to the mode 
ŽĨĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Indeed, ǁŚĞŶĞĂƌůŝĞƌďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐĂƌĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ĚŽŐŵĂ ?
(Champagne 2010) there are indications of a scientific revolution underway. While genes 
structure brain development, learning reinforces or suspends synaptic links leading Wexler 
 ? ? ? ? ? P ? ?ƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽ ‘ƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůĞŶĞƵƌŽƉůĂƐƚŝĐŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚĂƚŚĞƌŝŶĞDĂůĂďŽƵ ?ǁŝƚŚ allusion to 
DĂƌǆ ?ƚŽĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶďƌĂŝŶďƵƚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶŽƚŬŶŽǁŝƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?, 35). 




interaction with the environment through human action. Learning and memory reinforce or 
suspend synaptic connections. There is then a basis for reconfiguring the relations between 
nature, bodies and society, for which many sociologists have been calling for some time and 
which genetics and neuroscience are now obligingly enabling. Indeed, as Raymond Tallis 
(2012, p.152) comments the  ‘the increasing emphasis on post-genomics, epigenetics, 
integrative biology and the influence of the environment is an indirect criticism of the hype 
ĂƌŽƵŶĚE ? ?Certain brain regions appear to be continually modified by experience as new 
cells are generated in the hippocampus and olfactory bulb (Fulwiler, 2003).  Maguire et al 
(2006) compared the posterior hippocampi (linked to spatial awareness) of London taxi 
drivers with a control group and found using structural MRIs that those of taxi drivers were 
significantly larger relative to those of controls and that the variance was greater the longer 
drivers had been doing the job.  Damasio (1994, p.78)writes of a multi-layered self in which 
molecules, synapses, local circuits and systems, sociocultural factors, past and present, all 
intervene powerfully. dŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůďƌĂŝŶ ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĨŽƌĂŶĚĞŵƉĂƚŚǇ
ĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇƌĞƐŽŶĂƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŽůůŝŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƐĂƐ ‘ŚĂƌĚǁŝƌĞĚ
ĨŽƌƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇ ? ?
ƌŽŵďǇĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƉůĂƐƚŝĐŝƚǇ ‘ŚĂƐŝƚƐůŝŵŝƚƐŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ďƵƚ ‘ŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ
ďŽƚŚĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨŽƌĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇƚŚĂƚĐĂŶŶĞŝƚŚĞƌďĞ “ƌĞĂĚŽĨĨ ?
from the neural nor understood thoroughly in its absence. This trend is further exemplified 
in epigenetics, which attempts to identify the mechanisms of somatic plasticity whereby 
biology is modified by social experience while challenging much pervious biological 




Lamarckians on the transmissibility of acquired characteristics, which was for a long time 
thought heretical7. This is particularly salient for understanding both the bodily effects of 
violence and the mechanism for the neural coding of social influences. The environmental 
consequences of socially generated effects such as poverty, stress, exposure to toxins and 
poor diet prompt epigenetic mutation. One example of this is the onset of cancer where 
tumour suppressor genes are silenced and bodies are at risk of cancerous growths (Carey 
2012, p.215). Research on ƚŚĞ ‘ƵƚĐŚ,ƵŶŐĞƌtŝŶƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĨŽƵŶĚŐĞŶĞƚŝĐĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ
transmitted across three generations (e.g. Walker & Cicchetti, 2003). Exposure to stressful 
events can produce long-term biological alterations for example in the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, which regulates cortisol levels8 (Oitzl et al, 2010; Sharkey 2010; 
Yakyavi, 2014). Similarly studies with children of Holocaust survivors found increased 
susceptibility to stress across subsequent generations (Cicchetti et al, 2013) although this 
could also be transmitted environmentally. Nonetheless, it seems that persistent stress and 
fear have effects on brain development and can change neurocognitive functioning. Thus 
growing up in violent areas will have developmental effects since in neighbourhoods with 
high homicide rates children frequently experience fear, especially immediately following 
the discovery of a corpse, which in turn has effects on learning, memory and ability to deal 
with stress (Raine 2013, p.263). In this way epigenetics as Rose (2013) says creates Ă ‘ĐƌƵĐŝĂů
role for the social and human sciences in accounting for the shaping of vitality at the 
ŵŽůĞĐƵůĂƌůĞǀĞů ? ? 
The biosocial feedbacks between exposure and vulnerability to trauma indicate that it is 




and experienced through the body and large scale violence involves direct slaughter, 
ĂĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƐƐĂƵůƚƐŽŶǁŚŽůĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ ‘ƐůŽǁǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ŽĨĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůĂŶĚ
infrastructural degradations (McSorley, 2015). Post-traumatic stress disorder (PSTD) has 
transmissible bodily effects since trauma involves a fundamental rupture of a coherent 
sense of self and body.  Exposure to stress and toxins in childhood may increase 
vulnerability to disease, including PTSD and other mood and anxiety disorders through the 
developmental intra-action of genetic variants with neural circuits that regulate emotion 
(Neigh et al, 2009). Ethnographies of soldiers who experienced PTSD describe how 
knowůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƉŽůĂƚĞƐƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŐƌĂŵŵĂƚŝĐĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ?
and address the threats debilitating illness poses to self-concepts of masculinity and 
heteronormativity (Kilshaw, 2009). But Wool (2013) points out that valid as these cultural 
ĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐĂƌĞ ? ‘ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐWd^ĂƐĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƚĞǆƚ ?ĚƌĂǁƐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞƐŶĞƵƌŽƉŚǇƐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐWd^ǁŝƚŚƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ?
ŵĞŵŽŝƌĞƐ ?ďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐǀĞƚĞƌĂŶƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĂƵŵĂŽĨǁĂƌŝŶƚŽĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞǁŝƚh the wider 
research literature on PTSD. The genetic, neurochemical and neuroimaging findings then 
suggest a complex role for gene-environment intra-action in pathogenesis of violence 
(Staniloiu & Markowitsch, 2011). However, these effects are differentiated since not 
everyone exposed to trauma will demonstrate altered HPA axis functioning (Neigh et al, 
2009) suggesting that there are complex cumulative and intergenerational effects through 




Towards a biosocial theory 
If these observations are now focussed more closely on violence there are a number of 
issues to consider in developing a realist theory on multiple levels. The following discussion 
addresses two related aspects of this. First, the control paradigm in neuroscience, which has 
a parallel in sociology, both of which understand violence as a result of damaged or 
inadequate controls. Second, a more specific theory of emotionality and violence which 
integrates neurological and social explanations into a hypothetical model of violence and 
emotional entrainment. 
Violence, control and complexity 
A considerable amount of violence literature focusses on failures of control systems. This 
approach addresses mainly impulsive rather than predatory violence and will require 
qualifying in the following section but it enables us to think in terms of socio-neural systems. 
Control theories implicitly or explicitly invoke a Hobbesian theory of innate violence that has 
gradually been moderated by complex socio-psychological bonds. Steven Pinker for example 
ƐĂǇƐ ‘ŵŽƐƚŽĨƵƐ-including you, dear reader  W ĂƌĞǁŝƌĞĚĨŽƌǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?, 483). Similarly, 
David Buss (2006) claims that violence features extensively in the imagination but is 
generally inhibited, so for example, 91 per cent of men and 84 per cent of women have had 
ĂƚůĞĂƐƚŽŶĞǀŝǀŝĚĂŶĚŝŶƚĞŶƐĞĨĂŶƚĂƐǇŽĨĐŽŵŵŝƚƚŝŶŐŵƵƌĚĞƌƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂůůŽĨƵƐŚŽƵƐĞ
in our large brain specific specialized psychological circuits that lead us to contemplate 
murder as a solution to spĞĐŝĨŝĐĂĚĂƉƚŝǀĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?30). These theories will be 




For contemporary neuroscience the case of Phineas Gage in 1848 became an exemplar of 
the effects of traumatic frontal injury on affective behaviour, which is still regularly cited in 
neurological papers (e.g. K ?ƌŝƐĐŽůů& Leach 1998; Van Horn et al 2012; Verplaetse et al 
2009). Gage, aged 25, was the foreman of a crew cutting a railroad bed in Cavendish, 
Vermont. When using a tamping iron to pack explosive powder into a hole, the powder 
detonated and a tamping iron ? 43 inches long, 1.25 inches in diameter and weighing 13.25 
pounds ?ƐŚŽƚƵƉǁĂƌĚƐ ?ƉĞŶĞƚƌĂƚŝŶŐ'ĂŐĞ ?ƐůĞĨƚĐŚĞĞŬ ?ƉĂƐƐŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŚŝƐďƌĂŝŶĂŶĚƐŬƵůů ?
landing several feet away.  Remarkably he survived the accident and recovered but, 
according to some accounts, with significant personality change, becoming unpredictable, 
ǀŽůĂƚŝůĞ ?ŝƌƌĞǀĞƌĞŶƚ ? ‘ŝŶĚƵůŐŝŶŐĂƚƚŝŵĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƐƐĞƐƚƉƌŽĨĂŶŝƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŶŽƚƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ
his cƵƐƚŽŵ ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǁĂƐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌ'ĂŐĞ ? ?K ?ƌŝƐĐŽůů& Leach 1998). John Harlow, the physician 
who treated Gage with considerable skill, was influenced by phrenology and keen to 
demonstrate that the location of the brain damage had affected his self-control as a result 
of damage to the organs of Veneration and Benevolence (Macmillan, 2010). Whatever the 
facts of this case, the incident set the scene for subsequent neurological concepts of the 
frontal cortex control theories of violent behaviour and indeed for some simplification of 
ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽŶĞŵŝŐŚƚĐĂůůƚŚĞ ‘'ĂŐĞĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?9. 
ŝŽƐŽĐŝĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ‘ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŽďĞƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ
ŵƵůƚŝĨĂĐƚŽƌĂů ?ĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞƐŚŽǁŝŶŐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƉŚĞŶŽƚǇƉĞƐassociated with deficits in self-
control have a high probability of violence (DeLisi, 2015). The orbital PFC is involved in many 
pacifying and controlling faculties of the mind, including planning, self-control, empathy and 




the PFC predisposes actors to increased impulsiveness and low inhibition (e.g. Pietrini & 
Bambini, 2009). This is because the potential for violence, or at least aggressiveness, 
emotionality and impulsiveness arise from the core brain regions of oldest basal nuclei, the 
globus pallidus, the olfactory bulbs and amygdala, which in the functioning controlled brain 
are regulated by developed the PFC (Pallone & Hennessy, 1998; Brower & Price, 2001). The 
amygdala stores emotional memories, is central to learning to associate stimuli with 
consequences (Davidson et al, 2000) and reduces constraints on action when the actor 
perceives danger, so damage to neural circuits with the PFC can increase perception of and 
responses to threat (Fumagalli & Priori, 2012). Disruption of the neurotransmitters 
regulating cortisol, serotonin and testosterone, it is claimed, are often linked to aggressive 
behaviour  W where levels of the former are low and of the latter high (e.g. Bernhardt, 1997; 
Kuepper et al, 2010; Mehta & Beer, 2010; Raine, 2013). Dissociation of moral emotions from 
reasoning, where the actor has no interest in the consequences of their actions is also 
explained with reference to damage to the PFC and reduced metabolic activity (Haidt, 
2001). Neuropsychological defects, such as brain dysfunction, hormone and 
neurotransmitter abnormalities in the limbic system and PFC can be identified in murderers 
and habitually violent offenders. According to Pallone and Hennessy (1998) frontal lobe 
damage is found in homicide offenders to a rate of 32:1 with the general population.   
This evidence does not preclude social causes and it is possible that identification the PFC as 
crucial for controlling emotions and impulsivity might provide understanding of the gaps in 
existing explanations. While violent crime correlates with well-known social variables, such 




2011, pp.134-43), the pathways or mechanisms are not well understood and knowledge of 
neural processes develops explanations of the intra-action of the social and biological. Rain 
(2013, p. ? ? ? ?ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůŚĂƐƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŽďĞŵŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŚĂŶŝŵĂŐŝŶĞĚ ? ?ďǇ
whom he does not say). Similarly, WŝĞƚƌŝŶŝĂŶĚĂŵďŝŶŝ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐĂůůĨŽƌĂ ‘ŶŽŶ-reductionistic 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĂƚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŽƌǇůĞǀĞůƐ ?EŽůŽŶŐĞƌŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĂ
search for the  ‘ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŐĞŶĞ ?ďƵƚĐŽŵƉůĞǆƉŽƐƚ-genomic systems analysis suggest multiple 
biosocial influences (Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenburg, 2008; Hacking, 2006; Ferguson & 
Beaver, 2009; Meloni, 2014). There has been extensive research on the relationship the 
gene variant of the MAOA gene (that regulates neurotransmitters such as dopamine and 
serotonin) and childhood abuse. High levels of MAOA expression seem to protect against 
aggression in later life while low levels increase the risk (Roach & Pease 2015, p.75). We 
might note though that Brunner, the psychiatrist initially involved in this research, has 
distanced himself from some of the claims made for it10 and later findings are contradictory 
(Verhoeven et al, 2012). 
In a sense sociological control theories that regard violence as an outcome of defects in 
socially regulating bonds are the mirror of neuro control theories. Social control theory 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂŶƚŝƐŽĐŝĂůďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ŝƐƌĞĚƵĐĞĚďǇƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇƐŽĐŝĂůďŽŶĚƐƐuch as 
attachment and sensitivity to others, commitment (investment in conventional society), 
involvement (keeping occupied which reduces opportunities) and beliefs (commitment to 
obeying the law). Weakness of these bonds results in low self-ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?Ă ‘ƐĞmi-permanent 
ĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐ ?ƚŚĂƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞůŝĨĞ-ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?




majority of crimes as involving no planning, little loss, less gain, are pursued for short-term 
gratification with little weighing up of costs (Burt 2015, p.143). Further, the regulatory 
systems inhibiting violence will change over time and the long-term decline in European 
homicide from the Middle Ages to the mid-twentieth century (Eisner, 2001) is attributed in 
ƉĂƌƚƚŽƚŚĞŐƌŽǁƚŚŽĨƉƐǇĐŚŝĐĂů ‘ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ?^ƉŝĞƌĞŶďƵƌŐ, 1994). This 
could be seen as a kind of social-neural feedback, which Damasio (2012:292) calls 
 ‘ƐŽĐŝŽĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŚŽŵĞŽƐƚĂƐŝƐ ? ? 
Nonetheless, these are complex overdetermined systems of social and bodily intra-action 
and while anomalies found in the frontal limbic system are associated with loss of control 
they depend on their intra-action with social learning and environment (Brower & Price, 
2001; Pietrine & Bambini, 2009). It is not always acknowledged that whereas evolutionary 
psychologists (such as Pinker) often regard aggression as an evolutionarily adapted means of 
inter-group competition, neuroscience emphasises differential learning and failures of PFC 
controls as conditions for violent behaviour (De Schrijver 2009, p.263).  Further, the 
relationships between neural dysfunction and aggression are complex. For example, while 
 ‘ůĂĐŬŽĨĞŵƉĂƚŚǇ ?ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶĐŝƚĞĚĂƐĂĨĂĐƚŽƌŝŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐed aggressiveness, Decety et al (2008) 
found increased empathetic mimicry among youths predisposed to aggression, so that the 
injury or hurt of a friend or gang member could provoke exaggerated aggressive responses. 
What they do not note, however, is that this response in turn presupposes a social 
interactive process of group bonding and in-out group affective identifications and 
ŵŝŶĚƌĞĂĚŝŶŐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƚŚĞĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂƚĞƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?DĂƌŬ,Ăŵŵ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?




profound sense of hopelessness mixed with rage that no one could prevent terrible things 
ĨƌŽŵŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĐůŽƐĞĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉƐƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǇ ‘ĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽůŽǀĞĂŶĚǀĂůƵĞŽŶĞ
ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŝŶĂĨĂŵŝůǇ-like mentality (1994, p.184).  
In contrast to simple control theories, Collins argues that rather than view violence as innate 
ǁĞĂƌĞƌĂƚŚĞƌ ‘ŚĂƌĚ-ǁŝƌĞĚ ?ĨŽƌƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇĂŶĚ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĂůĞŶƚƌĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŵĂŬĞƐ
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚ ‘ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĐŽŶƚƌĂǀenes the tendency for entrainment in each 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĐŽŵŵŽŶĨŽĐƵƐŽĨĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŽůůŝŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? p.27). This 
explains why aggressive confrontations are far more common than violent ones (see also 
Felson et al, 2003) since the latter require overcoming inhibitions of confrontation 
tension/fear (ct/f ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽĐĐƵƌƐŽŶůǇŝŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐĂŵŽŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞǀŝŽůĞŶƚ
ĨĞǁ ? ? ? ? ? ?, p.370ff)11.  ǀĞŶƐŽ ?ŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ‘ŵŽƌĂůŚŽůŝĚĂǇ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŝƐ ?Ăƚ
least for some, an enjoyabůĞƌĞůĞĂƐĞĨƌŽŵĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐǁŚŝůĞŚŝƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ‘ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů
ĞŶƚƌĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?ĂƐŶŽƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?ŝŵƉůŝĞƐŶĞƵƌŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĨĞĞĚďĂĐŬůŽŽƉƐ ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨŚĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ
ƉƵƌƐƵĞƚŚŝƐĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ?dŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŽĨ ‘ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚƉĂŶŝĐ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ
intense emotional arousal  W ƌĂŐĞ ?ĨƌĞŶǌǇ ?ĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ƌŽĂƌŝŶŐĚŽǁŶĂƚƵŶŶĞů ?ĂŶĚůĂĐŬŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽů
from which one might not emerge, as when rampage shooting ends in suicide of the 
assailant (2008, pp.91-4).  Further, entrainment is dependent on unconscious (subliminal) 
mimicry involving mirror neurones and premotor links between perception and action 
(Decety & Batson 2009, p.115). Developing complex biosocial systems of violent behaviour 
will enable the development of multi-layered explanations such as that in Diagram 1, which 




For control theories violent emotions arise from below so to speak, from deep regions of 
the brain. However, violence is not only a control problem but on the contrary also involves 
overriding feelings of compassion and be directed by higher cognitive functions. Indeed, the 
ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽůůŝŶƐ ?ǁŽƌŬŝƐƚŚĂƚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŝƐĂ ‘ƐŬŝůů ?ĞǆŚŝďŝƚĞĚďǇƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇĨĞǁƉĞŽƉůĞ
rather than decontrolled raging. In this context one can distinguish ferocious from callous 
violence (Collins, 1974) which have different sources. Regarding the latter Pinker (2012, 
p. ? ? ? ?ƐĂǇƐƚŚĞ ‘ŵŽƐƚďƌƵƚĂůƐĞƌŝĂůŬŝůůĞƌƐŵŝŶŝŵŝǌĞĂŶĚĞǀĞŶũƵƐƚŝĨǇƚŚĞŝƌĐƌŝŵĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ĐĞƌĞďƌĂůƉĂƌƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĐĞƌĞďƌƵŵĂƌĞŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ ‘ŝŶŶĞƌĚĞŵŽŶƐŶŽƌďĞƚƚĞƌĂŶŐĞůƐ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚer tools 
ƚŚĂƚĐĂŶĨŽƐƚĞƌǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŽƌŝŶŚŝďŝƚŝƚ ?,ĂŶŶĂŚƌĞŶĚƚƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘,ŝŵŵůĞƌƚƌŝĐŬ ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇ
ŵĂƐƐŵƵƌĚĞƌĞƌƐĚŽŶŽƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƐĂǇ ‘tŚĂƚŚŽƌƌŝďůĞƚŚŝŶŐƐ/
have had to watch in performance of my duties, how heavily the task weighed on my 
ƐŚŽƵůĚĞƌƐ ? ?ƌĞŶĚƚ 2006, p. ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞďǇĐŽŶŐƌĂƚƵůĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŽŶƚŚĞŝƌŚŝŐŚĞƌ ‘ĞƚŚŝĐĂů ?
ǁŝůůƚŽƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶǇƚĞŵƉƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŐŝǀĞŝŶƚŽŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐ ?ĞǆĞŵƉůŝĨŝĞĚďǇ,ŝŵŵůĞƌ ?Ɛ
1943 speech to SS officers in Poznan12. This illustrates the complexity of ethical and moral 
ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƐŶŽƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŶŽƚƐŝŵƉůǇ ‘ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐ ?ďƵƚcan also facilitate 
dehumanization and violence especially when combined with disgust. Damage/control 
theories address some violent situations but a theory of the emergence of violent action 
needs to elaborate the role of emotions and the meanings of violence for perpetrators. 
The materiality of emotions 
There are parallels between social and biosocial control theories although this approach to 
violence is limited, being a hydraulic model of impulse and control. An emergent theory of 




socio-neural responses might be developed through attention to emotionality. It has been 
seen that nĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŝƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ‘ŚĂƌĚ ?ďƵƚrather is an embedded social practice 
that, like any other, requires social reflexivity on its methods and results. The 
 ‘ŶĞƵƌŽŵŽůĞĐƵůĂƌŐĂǌĞ ? risks  ‘ĨůĂƚƚĞning ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ?Cromby et al, 2011) effecting a shift 
from social and psychological to biological systems, yet neuroscience has developed frames 
of reference that are open to social analysis. At the same time, while sociology has given 
attention to the embodied nature of sociality, and in particular to emotions, it has not 
grappled with deeper somatic embeddedness. This can be pursued with reference to the 
role of emotions in behaviour and concepts of the self. While social judgement is formed 
intersubjectively (and cannot therefore be purely individual) moral and normative 
judgements at the same time involve complex limbic processes. People have high emotional 
investment in mutually shared social expectations, which is Illustrated by the resultant 
outrage and moral anger when they are breached ĂƐĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝŶ'ĂƌŬŝŶŬĞů ?ƐďƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐ
experiments (Barbalet 2001, p.143). Indeed, arguably, judgements about action involve 
moral emotions more than they do moral reasoning which is rarely the direct cause of 
actions and reasoning is often formulated ex post facto and orientated to social 
expectations (Haidt, 2001). As George Herbert Mead (1967, p. ? ? ? ?ƉƵƚŝƚ ? ‘/ƚŝƐŽŶůǇĂĨƚĞƌǁĞ
have acted that we know what we have done ? ?
Emotions are core to Thomas Scheff ?Ɛ theory that violence is always the outcome of spirals 
of unacknowledged shame and rage, a thesis he attempts to demonstrate across micro and 
macro levels of behaviour. Shame, he says, is Ă ‘ŵĂƐƚĞƌĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ?in the sense that 




the same time warps our understanding of ourselves and others in a way that makes 
sustainable relations extremely difficult. For Scheff shame is the motor of violence when 
repressed and operates in a similar way to unresolved grief ĂƐ ‘ŚƵŵŝůŝĂƚĞĚĨƵƌǇ ?. He 
identifies alternating pathways of silence/violence, especially among men who internalize 
dominant conceptions of masculinity: 
Hypermasculine men are silent about their feelings to the point of repressing them 
ĂůƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ĞǀĞŶĂŶŐĞƌ ? ?ZĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐůŽǀĞĂŶĚƚŚĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ?ůĞĂĚƐƚŽ
either silence or withdrawal, on the one hand, or acting out anger (flagrant hostility), 
on the other. The composure and poise of hypermasculinity seems to be a recipe for 
silence and violence. (Scheff 2006a) 
Emotional responses then are structured by social relations (in this case gender) but 
manifest along pathways that are not easily available to verbal recognition and articulation. 
This is why both interpersonal and macro conflicts that are embedded in shame dynamics 
become interminable cycles of quarrels and impasses that will not be susceptible to easy 
resolution. Further these styles of communication are learned in childhood (Scheff 2006b, 
p.31) and structure adult relationships although they will be culturally variable arising from 
differential socialization patterns. In an  ‘ŚŽŶŽƵƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ, violence might be a 
socially expected response among men to a perceived shaming (see for example Nisbett & 
Cohen, 1996).  
This model has been applied in various ways. For example, Ray et al (2004) argued with 




combination of material disadvantage with the social shame of exclusion was violently 
ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐĞĚĂƐ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚĞŽƵƐĂŶŐĞƌ ?ŽŶƐǇŵďŽůƐŽĨƐŚĂŵĞĂŶĚĞǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶ PƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞ ?ůŽĐĂů
communities and consumer goods. James Gilligan notes that  ‘ƚŚĞƉƌŝƐŽŶŝŶŵĂƚĞƐ/ǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚ
have told me repeatedly, when I asked them why they had assaulted someone, that it was 
because 'he disrespected ŵĞ ‘ (2000, p.106) aŶĚ ‘/ŚĂǀĞǇĞƚƚŽƐĞĞĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĂĐƚŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ
that was not provoked by the experience of feeling shamed and humiliated, disrespected 
and ridiculed, and that did not represent the attempt to prevent or undo this "loss of face" - 
ŶŽŵĂƚƚĞƌŚŽǁƐĞǀĞƌĞƚŚĞƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨŝƚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĚĞĂƚŚ ? ?2000, p.110). This 
ƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞƐǁŝƚŚ^ĐŚĞĨĨ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚthe cycle of repressed shame-alienation-lack of empathy-
aggression can result in violent outbursts. The self is emotionally valenced, that is, 
structured by the intrinsic attractiveness (positive valence) or aversiveness (negative 
valence) of an event. However, according to this view, some emotions are a threat to the 
self and are placed  ‘ŽƵƚŽĨƌĞĂĐŚ ?, that is, repressed but nonetheless retain the power to 
affect interpersonal relationships. Shame further entails angry passivity since, as Jack Katz 
(1999, p. ? ? ? ?ŶŽƚĞƐ ?ŝƚŝƐƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶƚƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀĞǀŽŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĚĞŶŽƚĞƐŝ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌĂĐƚŝŽŶthat 
 ‘ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐŽŶĞƐďĞŝŶŐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŽŶĞ ?ƐĚŽŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ?, p.146). He continues to suggest that 
shame involves mystery, something hidden, isolation from community, moral inferiority, 
vulnerability, and a sense of chaos.  
These accounts though do not explore the embodidness of emotion or repression as a 
psychoneural process. While the source of humiliation will be social, as a feeling it is 
expressed in the brain and engages complex neural processes, being then an example of 




is true that rĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŝƐŶŽƚĂ ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚĨŽƌŶĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƐŽŵĞ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ
Heather Berlin (2011) are working on possible neural process of repression to show that 
ƐƵďůŝŵŝŶĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐĞǀŽŬĞĂĐƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽƌƚŝĐĂůĂƌĞĂƐƐŽƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ‘ĨĞĞůƚŚŝŶŐƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞǇĨĞĞůƚŚĞŵ ? ?dŚŝƐŝĚĞĂŝƐĂůƐŽcentral ƚŽĂŵĂƐŝŽ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ
where emotions are biological-organic and symbolic gestures that appear as intense arousal 
but without being acknowledged as feelings. So ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĐĂŶ ‘ĨĞĞůǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŬŶŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞǇ
ĨĞĞů ?although these feelings manifest behaviourally and can be observed by third parties  W 
such as someone unconsciously expressing aversion to a member of an ethnic minority 
(2011, p.40). He proposes a three-stage process whereby states of emotion once triggered 
in brain stem nuclei ĂƉƉĞĂƌĂƐƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐ ? ‘ŚĂǀŝŶŐĂĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ? ? which can become 
known, that is, conscious but private, then publicly articulated feelings. These correspond 
the three levels of the self  W the proto-self, which is unconscious and experiences primordial 
feelings but also the capacity to interact with others; ƚŚĞĐŽƌĞƐĞůĨ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŚĞĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ‘/ ?ŽĨ
self-awareness and narrative sequences of images and feelings of emotion; and the 
ĂƵƚŽďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůƐĞůĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ǁŚĂƚ/Ăŵ ?ŽĨŵĞŵŽƌŝĞƐĂŶĚƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůŝƚǇ13. This is relevant for 
understanding the source of violent emotions in that unlike control theories it envisages a 
complex biofeedback process. The brain can stimulate but also simulate bodily states since 
as we witness the actions of another our body-brain adopts the feeling state (as-if) we 
would assume ourselves (2012, p.104). The recall of ideas and memories modifies the body 
in loops engaging cognitive reactions and normative principles along with feelings of 




that violence is a legitimate response to perceived humiliation, derive in part from neurally 
encoded learning and also from socially shared expectations.  
While Damasio does not explicitly acknowledge the process of repression14 he regards 
homeostasis as a core neurological process (e.g. 2012 passim). Since this maintains the 
stable equilibrium of the organism and shame is experienced as emotional pain and a threat 
to ŽŶĞ ?ƐƐĞůĨ-identity, homeostasis could be a neural process for the repression of shame 
and protection of self-identity. A similar analysis of the socio-neural bases of shame and 
violence is developed by Jonathan Turner (2007) who ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƚŚĞ
ďƌĂŝŶĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶǁŽƌĚƐ ?15. Rather emotions are gestalt patterns that are translated 
ŝŶƚŽƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŝĂůƐƉĞĞĐŚǀŝĂƌŽĐĂ ?ƐĂƌĞĂĂŶĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐǀŝĂtĞƌŶŝĐŬĞ ?ƐĂƌĞĂ ?
Quick emotional processing (based in the amygdala and habituated responses) vies with 
specialized spatio-temporal other-directed thought (Haidt, 2001) and in situations of Collins ?
ct/f the former will exercise hegemony over the latter. Whereas positive emotions are 
attributed to the self and reinforced in interaction rituals, negative emotions will tend to be 
repressed and attributed to external objects. However, while Damasio describes how feeling 
perceptions are mapped onto the conscious self he does not deal with misattribution where 
the subject does not recognize the sources of shame or indeed why they are responding 
violently to certain stimuli. For example, street gangs whose members dropped out of 
schools often do not vent their anger at the schools but at other gangs (Turner 2007) or 




Further, there is a developmental biosocial intra-action following the experience of injustice 
and abuse. Based on ethnographic work in economically depressed urban areas in northern 
England, Winlow (2014) found that experience of traumatic events and prolonged periods of 
insecurity during childhood, set against a cultural background which values violent response 
to perceived humiliation, can act to create a deep commitment to physical violence. He 
identifies  ‘ĂĨŽƌŵŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇƚŚĂƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐŝƚƐĞůĨƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ?
dŚŝƐĐŽƵůĚ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚtŝŶůŽǁ ?ƐLacanian theoretical approach would not suggest enthusiasm 
for it) be further investigated with reference to research noted above on low MAOA 
expression, childhood trauma and aggression. 
This line of thought might open a nexus for connecting social experience, self-concept, 
psychodynamics and the brain as overdetermined complex material processes. This might 
be particularly productive if one focusses less on the brain damage model (the Gage effect) 
but more on the intra-action between neurosocial processes and developmental 
trajectories. For example, for Honneth (2007, p.72) negative emotional states of shame, 
anger and frustration make us conscious of an injustice although these are not automatically 
experienced as such. Rather, disrespect in a set of relationships in which one seeks 
recognition can result in internalisation of the rejection, as shame. Experienced as conscious 
ĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ?ŝŶĂŵĂƐŝŽ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐ ?ƚŚŝƐŵŝŐŚƚŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƐĚŝĨĨƵƐĞĂŶǆŝĞƚǇĂŶĚĂŶŐĞƌĂŶĚƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞŝŶ
imagining or inflicting harm justified, as noted above, ĂƐ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚĞŽƵƐĂŶŐĞƌ ? ?dŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌmight 
as Turner (2007) says be intensified by networks of like-minded individuals where repressed 




of racist skinheads) and social identities that seek scapegoats for experiences of rejection 
and anger.  
These threads can be pulled together in a hypothetical model of biosocial intra-actions in 
Diagram 1 ƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ďŽǆŽůŽŐǇ ?ŽĨEŝĐŚŽůƐĂŶĚ^ƚŝĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ?. The sources of social shame 
and injustice leave traces in damaged development and possibly increased susceptibility to 
ƐƚƌĞƐƐǁŝƚŚĐǇĐůĞƐŽĨŚǇƉĞƌĂƌŽƵƐĂůĂŶĚŚǇƉĞƌƋƵŝĞƐĞŶĐĞ ?^ĐŚĞĨĨ ?ƐĂůŝĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶŐĞƌ ?ďŽƚŚŽĨ
which stimulate the limbic system because they involve intense feelings. Triggers of 
aggressive response might be endogenous as in self-entrainment, or exogenous, such as 
perceived humiliation or circumstances of a moral holiday. These are both affective and 
cognitive responses and might entail imagining pleasure in inflicting harm. This as Bollas 
(1995, p.209) suggests unconsciously seeks to induce in others the experience of traumatic 
breakdown in trust in the benignity of the world that they experienced. Violence breaks 
through to remaster trauma and convert anxiety into excitement (1995, 209). This model 
proposes multiple non-reducible levels of biography, self, neural process, socio-political 
contexts and the feedbacks between them. While these feelings arise in part endogenously 
they are also likely to find legitimation in networks of other individuals  W thus achieving both 
solidarity and a coordinated arousal of the limbic system in a sense of unity.  ‘Nothing ? as 
René Girard commentƐ ?ŝƐĂƐ ‘socially cathartic as righteous violence especially when 
ƵŶĂŶŝŵŽƵƐ ? ?Girard, 1977, p.78) This feedback between feelings, body and group might be 
short-lived, as in the moral holiday afforded by a riot, or is encoded into habits of action and 
persist over longer periods and transmitted across generations. In the latter case it can be 




example the humiliation of defeat is often nurtured more caringly than the celebration of 
victories  W one instance of this was the ŵŽďŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌŝĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ1389 Serbian 
defeat at Kosovo Polje (Ray, 1999). In this way interpersonal and collective violence can be 
understood as outcomes of complex overdetermined neural, historical and social processes. 




and identifications in relation to sociaůĂŶĚŶĞƵƌŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?one answer is that we would 
approach the latter with critical and sceptical openness. A better understanding of both the 
sociological body and violence might be developed through engagement with neuroscience 
on the basis of a non-reductive epistemological pluralism that moves beyond a human 
subject divided along disciplinary lines into a bodily and social presence. Fulwiler (2003) 
ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ ‘tŚĞƚŚĞƌǁĞĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚƌĂƵŵĂ ?ƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ ?ŽƌƌĂĐŝƐŵĂƐĐĂƵƐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůƉĂƚŚǁĂǇƚŽ
violent behavior is through the brain. Our understanding of these influences will not be 
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞďŝŽůŽŐǇ ? ?ŶŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞƌĂŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŵĂǇďĞŶĞŽƌŽďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ
accurate but is sociologically anodyne for few would doubt that neural conditions 
correspond to actions and states of mind (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013, 145). However, if 
research establishes mutually determining feedbacks it is contributing to a more 
comprehensive theory of action. This will generate constructive interdisciplinary 
engagement only if we acknowledge the tensions and challenges of the project. Some who 




sociological import of cultural biology, the social brain, the social context of neurological 
knowledge and so on, which of course is very interesting but risks bringing neuroscience 
safely within the social sciences and thereby neutralizing any challenge it might otherwise 
pose. Neuroscientists are already engaged in discussing issues such as contextual 
experimenter bias and the intra-action of social and neural processes. Constructive 
engagement will acknowledge the materiality of neural processes while resisting reductions 
of complex biosocial processes to the influence of tissue connectivity. Humans are biosocial 
and social action requires neural coding as a sufficient condition for action but in turn 
bodies are moulded by culture, perhaps to a more fundamental degree than previously 
thought. Like any other social practice, brain science itself is embedded in political, 
economic and social formations with which it interacts. Certainly, recent developments in 
neuroscience contain dangers of reductionism and of further medicalizing matters of 
normative interaction and deliberation. Yet they might also suggest new ways of thinking 
about the social and the embodied that offer thicker understandings of the processes of 
violence and embodiment. The purpose of suggesting, somewhat programmatically, such 
engagement with neurology is not to fix or to legitimate existing social relations. On the 
contrary, the conservative view of fixed  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ŝƐitself challenged by recent 
developments that historicize and socialize the body. Indeed, violence is often an outcome 
of the embodiment of the unruly forces of contemporary society itself, with its alienating 
methods of production, growing inequalities and techniques of power. The purpose of the 
critique of the conditions that generate violence is to seek ways in which the impersonal 





1 Depending on what search terms are entered, there are around 70,000 papers on neurology and violence or 
aggression of which 60,000 have been published since 2000. 
2 An epigenetic effect is where the DNA nucleotide remains fixed but chromatin proteins that affect gene 
expression may become altered by the environment throughout life and transfer to next generation 
(Champagne, 2010).  
3 Theirs is to write novel genealogies of entanglement of social and natural informed by Actor Network Theory. 
4 Siegel et al (2013) found that in the US each percentage increase in gun ownership was accompanied by a 0.9 
per cent increase in homicide. 
5 &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĂƌĂĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ŝŶƚƌĂ-ĂĐ ŝŽŶ ?ŝƐƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽĐĂƉƚƵƌĞƚŚĞĞŶƚĂnglement of social and 
biological processes. 
6 Third-person mindreading though, as Nichols and Stich (2003) show, is a rather complicated process. 
7 Epigenetics, still at an early stage of development, appears overcome the Weismann Barrier  W the principle 
that hereditary information moves only from genes to body cells, and never in reverse (Fuller, 2011, p.20). 
8 The HPA axis is a limbic feedback process that releases the hormone cortisol in response to stress while a 
poorly functioning HPA can increase vulnerability to stress (Smith et al, 2006). 
9 ĂŵĂƐŝŽĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĂĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ'ĂŐĞ ?ƐŝŶũƵƌŝĞƐĂŶĚĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚĐĂƵƐĞĚĂůĞƐŝŽŶŝŶ
the frontal cortex, at the position assumed to be responsible for regulation of social behaviour (Pietrini & 
Bambini, 2009). Even so, some accounts suggest that his personality change was less pronounced and more 
temporary than often suggested (e.g. Macmillan, 2000; Macmillan & Lena, 2010), which would make the case 
even more neurologically interesting. 
10 He ƐĂǇƐ ‘ŐĞŶĞƐĂƌĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƐŝŵƉůĞĂŶĚďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŝƐďǇĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ?ĂĚŝƌĞĐƚĐĂƵƐĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂƐŝŶŐůĞŐĞŶĞĂŶĚĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŝƐŚŝŐŚůǇƵŶůŝŬĞůǇ ? ?ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĂŐĞŶĞƚŚĂƚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ
ĞŶĐŽĚĞƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŝƐƵŶƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ? ?ƌƵŶŶĞƌ ? ? ?96). 





                                                                                                                                                                  
 
11 dŚĞ ‘ǀŝŽůĞŶƚĨĞǁ ?ŽǀĞƌĐŽŵĞĐƚ ?Ĩ W in various ways: attacking weak and vulnerable, audience-oriented (such as 
ĚƵĞůƐĂŶĚ ‘ƌŝŽƚƐ ? ? ?ƌĞŵŽƚĞǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ĨŝƌŝŶŐŵŝƐƐ ůĞƐ ? ?ĚĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ŚŝƚŵĞŶ ?ƐŶŝƉĞƌƐ ?ƐƵŝĐŝĚĞďŽŵďĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚƉĂŶŝĐ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůŝŵƉƵůƐĞƐĂƌĞŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐ ? ?ůŝŬĞ ‘ƌŽĂƌŝŶŐĚŽǁŶĂƚƵŶŶĞů ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶƌĞƐƵůƚ
in calculated and extreme violence. 
12  ‘DŽƐƚŽĨǇŽƵŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚŝƚŵĞĂŶƐƚŽƐĞĞĂŚƵŶĚƌĞĚĐŽƌƉƐĞƐůǇŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ĨŝǀĞŚƵŶĚƌĞĚ ?ŽƌĂƚŚŽƵƐĂŶĚ ?dŽ
ŚĂǀĞŐŽŶĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐĂŶĚǇĞƚ ?ƚŽ have remained decent fellows, this is what has made us hard. This is a 
ŐůŽƌŝŽƵƐƉĂŐĞŝŶŽƵƌŚŝƐƚŽƌǇƚŚĂƚŚĂƐŶĞǀĞƌďĞĞŶǁƌŝƚƚĞŶĂŶĚƐŚĂůůŶĞǀĞƌďĞǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ ?
http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/holocaust/h-posen.htm  
13 Damasio (2012, p.202) does not claim that these levels of the self correspond to cerebral localities but rather 
emerge from systematic cooperation between the brain stem and cerebral cortex.  
14 ,ŝƐƚƌŝƉĂƌƚŝƚĞŵŽĚĞůŝƐƌĞŵŝŶŝƐĐĞŶƚŽĨ&ƌĞƵĚ ?ƐďƵƚŚŝƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐ ? ?ƉƌŽƚŽ-self) is essentially pre-
Freudian and refers to autonomic neural processes rather than a site of repressed ideas. 
15  ‘tŝƚŚŝŶĂĨĞǁŚƵŶĚƌĞĚŵŝůůŝƐĞĐŽŶĚƐƚŚĞĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂƐcade manages to transform the state of several 
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